Essential reading in understanding why the Enlightenment ideal of rationality is dead or at least doesn't count in ways that matter. In particular, Kuhn calls into question the idea of science as a rational enterprise, and since science is epistemologically privileged and thought to be the essence of rationality, to call into question the rationality of science is to call into question rationality itself. This is different, I submit, than the anti-rationality of the deconstructionists (e.g., Derrida), which seems to lack immediate real world consequences (aside form contributing to a sense of alienation in some). I find Hegel to be a precursor of Kuhn. Hegel attempted to describe how we come to believe what we believe, and Kuhn attempts to do this in the field of science, and, it should be added, with much more accessibly.There are some who will find Kuhn lacking all coherence (sophisticated BS, as one person put it), and that is another way of saying "irrational". For those who associate irrationality with things like religious fundamentalism, irrationalism is a fearful thing. Yet, it is rationality itself that has been called into question by the events of the 20th century, beginning with the carnage of WWI. The answer is not more rationalism. Rationalism, the primacy of reason and the center of modernism, is itself a belief, and the crisis of modernity is the recognition that reason has no more claim to a privileged position than religion. The answer may be, as Rorty has pointed out, deciding what we want to believe without being forced to justify the basis of those beliefs: we believe because our beliefs support what we hold to be good things(neo-pragmatism) That may be a fearful thing for those who don't find complete correspondence between their beliefs and Rorty's privileged beliefs. What, though, it does show, is that irrationality is not sufficient grounds for being dismissive. In doing so one may be taking a stance on the wrong side of the arrow of history. The arrow, though, is not that of the Whig theory of history, where things constantly improve driven by reason. Historians of this view (as well as much of popular culture) denigrate older views by degrading them to myth or religious belief status. This gives a privileged position to our own, contemporary beliefs and gives us a sense of comfort. Kuhn disturbs this comfortable view by showing, for example, that Ptolemaic astronomy gave plausible answers to questions of the day. So too, one could argue that the contemporary dismissive view of Scholastic philosophy is more the result of Enlightenment propaganda than of merit. At the least, Kuhn is a good (partial) antidote for contemporary smugness --- a challenge to bourgeois sentiment. Kuhn, though, is much more than a cultural caution; he is an important voice in the contemporary philosophical debate.Who would like "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"? Those who like ideas with profound consequences easily presented. Kuhn is a Nietzsche, and like Nietzsche is at the very least a fun read. He is much more if taken seriously. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is an important book, because it helped people view scientific progress in a new light, and introduced us to the important concept of paradigm shift. Unfortunately, however, the book is poorly written, with a dense and overly academic style, and quite frankly, is very, very, boring. Good concept, poor execution. I read SSR as part of preparation to begin work on a paper and received a very different dose of smart than I expected.Kuhn has shown how meaningful, and I daresay fun, the prospect of a career as a researcher in any field could be. In this classic work he also guts a lot of intuitive thoughts on science, discovery, and broader knowledge itself - after a thorough reading you'll really see these processes almost totally redefined.As a non-science major I found all the scientific antecedents to which he frequently and swiftly referred (i.e., Leyden jar, relativity, photoelectric effect) coupled with the dense, elevated writing quite difficult to get through. Still, with slow and focused reading, and a little bit of note taking, which I would suggest to anyone without a PhD, I feel like the main ideas are quite digestible. Although this is one of the most important books I've read, it is also one of the least fulfilling. Let me start out by saying that I am a casual reader of the history and philosophy of science. This book, described as being one of the most important in its area, is not for the casual reader. It is a scholarly work and it presumes a great deal of scientific knowledge. When discussing a specific revolution, Thomas Kuhn does not go into the details of the science behind the revolution; he just assumes that the reader knows it. And befitting its stature, the book was written in a very scholarly tone. Unfortunately this meant that I had to do a lot of digging to reach the kernel of the point that Kuhn was trying to make. However, Kuhn's revelations about how scientific revolutions come about and the role of normal science answered a lot of my questions. His discussions of paradigms were also very enlightening and he certainly explained why old ideas are so difficult to overthrow. Indeed, now that I've read this book, I recognize when other authors refer to his thinking. Overall though, I do not recommend this book to other casual readers.Kuhn's theory has been met with lavish praise, nuanced criticism, vitriol and dismissal. This polemical book challenges assumptions about the way science has worked, and delineates the pattern of scientific progress in terms of changing patterns and modes of thought: normal (puzzle-solving) science, the build up of anomalies, and the introduction of new paradigms. Distilled to its essence, Kuhn argues that scientific study is not immune from the human intricacies that plague other fields of scholarship. My major critiques are as follows:1.) Many defenders of science as an endeavor dismiss Kuhn. I think Kuhn gives science too much credit. Kuhn was trained as a scientist, and is obviously aware of the great contributions that science has given to society, but he ignores the fact that science interlopes with other parts of society. It is not totally self-contained but has borrowed ideas from revolutions in other realms, such as the enlightenment.2.) He sometimes falls into the trap ahistorical timelessness when discussing the notion that knowledge is not accumulated, but rather gestalt shifts govern revolution. 3.) He speaks in such vague language that its difficult to tease apart any real meaning. Such is the nature of any theoretical approach, I suppose. For example, there are branches of scientific study that do just accumulate knowledge, he ignores them and paints with broad strokes. In the first few chapters he explains that he's not talking about applied science, but in doing so avoids having to address technological advances spurring scientific change (see PCR technology, DNA sequencing etc.)Kuhn's argument has its deficiencies but it provides a lens through which to view scientific advancement. I cringe at attempts to use Kuhn to attack science as a study or ridicule it. Science has no monopoly on truth, but it happens to be an extremely important endeavor. None of this was Kuhn's intent. He was just trying to describe his observations. Apparently he did something right because its still being cited, published, and reviewed into the 21st century.
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